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1 Introduction
Government intervention is a common way to stabilize nancial markets, especially during
a nancial crisis or a stock market meltdown. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic
in 2020, the Federal Reserve of America, Bank of Japan and other central banks purchased
massive quantities of government bonds, ABS, ETF and other nancial assets.1 While the
governments goal is to ensure nancial stability, whether or not government intervention
has some externalities when deployed against market uctuations remains an open question.
For example, Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020) show that government intervention
reduces the informational e¢ciency of asset prices.
From 2015 to 2016, Chinas stock market experienced three major market crashes, and
the market index decreased approximately 50% in 6 months. The intervention of Chinese
government was very aggressive during the period, especially the organization of a national
team which directly purchased stocks of more than 1,000 rms (Huang, Miao and Wang,
2019). It is well known that the majority of investors in Chinas stock market are inexpe-
rienced retail investors, and some believe that those investors contributed signicantly to
the market crash. For this reason, Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020) analyzed the
implications of government intervention to reduce price volatility induced by noise traders.
However, some insiders who have superior information about the rms also trade strategi-
cally during the period of government intervention. For example, the managers of the listed
rm, Mei Yan Ji Xiang, bought their own rm stocks in July of 2015 and cleared the posi-
tions after 6 months.2 Given various investor structures, how does government intervention
a¤ect the strategic trading of informed traders? What are the corresponding market-quality
implications? In this paper, we study those questions by developing a multi-period model
including price impact and informed trading.
1Government intervention does not necessarily happen in a nancial crisis. For instance, the Japanese
government expands its stock purchase program gradually to control deation (Shirai, 2018).
2On August 4, 2015, the rm of Mei Yan Ji Xiang made an announcement that China Central Huijin
Investment Limited (CCH), a member of the national team, became the largest shareholder. In the next
10 trading days, the stock price increased over 250%.
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We develop a two-period Kyle (1985) model to analyze the impact of government in-
tervention through direct trading in the stock market. We consider an economy with two
assets, a risky and a risk-free asset, respectively. There are four types of traders: a risk-
neutral insider with perfect information, a representative risk-neutral competitive market
maker, noise traders and a government with imperfect information.3 The objective function
of the government includes two parts. The rst part is to minimize the price volatility, which
is policy related. The second part is prot maximization, which is the same as that of the
insider. We consider a linear equilibrium in which the trading strategies and the pricing
functions are all linear. We solve the linear perfect Bayesian equilibrium and explore the
trading behavior of the government and the insider as well as the e¤ectiveness of government
intervention through trading in the nancial market.
Our analysis delivers two important messages. First, we nd that both the government
and the insider can engage in reversed trading strategies, but in opposite directions, which
implies that they e¤ectively trade against each other in both periods. This situation arises
when the government has very precise information and cares much about its policy goal
of price stability. Specically, in this situation, seeing strong fundamental information, the
insider sells (as opposed to buys) in the rst period and then buys in the second period.
Meanwhile, the government buys in the rst period and then sells in the second period. The
intuition is primarily driven by the fact that the insider wants to conceal his information
in period 1 and exploits more information advantage in period 2. If the government has
very precise information and weighs its policy goal heavily, the insider trades against the
government to conceal his information in period 1, and at the same time, the government
trades against the insider to stabilize prices.
On the other hand, when the governments information quality is low, the insider is not
heavily inuenced by the presence of the government and so it will trade in a way similar
to that in the standard Kyle model with one insider, without reversed trading strategies.
3We use he/him to refer to the insider, she/her to refer to the market maker, and it/its to refer to
the government.
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Similarly, when the government does not care much about its policy goal, the model is similar
to a standard Kyle setting with two insiders, and again, no reversed trading strategies arise.
The second important message delivered by our analysis is that government intervention
can not only stabilize the nancial market but also improve market liquidity and price
e¢ciency simultaneously and that the e¤ectiveness of government intervention is positively
related to the governments information quality. This result suggests that it is most e¤ective
for the government to intervene via direct trading only when it has private information with
great quality. Otherwise, the e¤ect of government trading is limited.
Specically, in terms of market-liquidity implications, we nd that relative to the standard
Kyle setting, government intervention only slightly a¤ects the period-1 market liquidity but
improves the period-2 market liquidity. When the government has no policy concerns and
very precise information, market liquidity is slightly smaller than that of the Kyle model in
period 1, which shows that private information has a mild negative e¤ect on market liquidity.
When the government has imprecise information and cares more about price stability, the
market liquidity is larger than that of the Kyle model in period 1. In period 2, the market
liquidity is always larger than that of the Kyle model and does not hinge on the policy
weight of the government. When the governments information quality is very low, the
market liquidity measures in two periods converge to that of the Kyle model. The negative
e¤ect of information on market liquidity cancels out the positive e¤ect of policy concerns.
In regard to the implications for price e¢ciency, government intervention e¤ectively in-
creases price discovery/e¢ciency in two periods. Because the government has information
about fundamentals, its informative trading improves price discovery of the nancial market.
More interestingly, price discovery increases in terms of the policy weight of the government
in period 1 and decreases in period 2. Intuitively, in period 1, the insider trades less by
hedging on the larger policy weight of the government. To hedge on the insiders reserved
trading, the government trades more, which increases the total amount of the informational
trading and hence improves price discovery. In period 2, the insider exploits the remaining
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information advantage and trades more aggressively to hedge on the larger policy weight.
Since the government cares more about price stability, it has to trade less aggressively, so
price discovery decreases in period 2. Moreover, if the governments information quality is
very low, the price discovery measures in two periods are very close to and slightly less than
those of the standard Kyle model.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature studying the implications
of government intervention in asset markets, with a focus on Chinas stock market. Gov-
ernment intervention happens in many regions and countries and is extensively analyzed in
the literature. For example, Veronesi and Zingales (2010) analyze the costs and benets of
Paulsons plan in the United States, and Cheng, Fung and Chan (2000) and Su, Yip and
Wong (2002) study the implications of the intervention of the Hong Kong government during
the nancial crisis in 1998.
Moreover, the analysis of government intervention needs to model a stylized govern-
ment with explicit policy goals. Bhattacharya and Weller (1997), Pasquariello (2017), and
Pasquariello, Roush and Vega (2020) study a central bank with a policy goal to minimize
the expected squared distance between the traded assets equilibrium price and the target.
In our model, the government is represented by the national team which directly trades
in Chinas stock market, and its policy goal is to minimize the expected squared distance
between two equilibrium prices in di¤erent periods.
Various policy tools were used to stabilize the market through government intervention
in Chinas stock market in 2015.4 Chen et al. (2019) study destructive market behaviors
induced by the daily price limits; Liu, Xu and Zhong (2017) show that price limits and
trading suspension can induce contagion; and Chen, Petukhov and Wang (2019) analyze
the dark side of circuit breakers. Moreover, Bian et al. (2021) nd that marginal investors
are forced to resell during a market crash, and Huang, Miao and Wang (2019) show that
government intervention in 2015 both created value and improved liquidity. Our paper,
4More details are summarized by Song and Xiong (2018) and Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020).
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complementary to the literature, analyzes how government intervention a¤ects the informed
and strategic trading behaviors of market participants. Moreover, our theoretical prediction
about liquidity is consistent with Huang, Miao and Wang (2019).
Our paper is closely related to the work of Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020), who
analyze the implications of government intervention to reduce price volatility induced by
noise traders (e.g., De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann,1990). In particular, Brun-
nermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020) nd that information e¢ciency of asset prices is reduced.
In Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020), the market volatility comes from noisy trading,
and the government has no private information. For this reason, government intervention
to reduce price volatility decreases information e¢ciency. By contrast, in our model, the
market volatility stems from speculative insider trading and the government has information
about the fundamentals, which implies that government intervention e¤ectively stabilizes
the asset prices and improves the price e¢ciency of the nancial markets.
Our model considers price impact and informed trading, which originates from Kyle
(1985). Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001) solve a two period Kyle model that is treated
as a benchmark in our paper. We solve the model by conjecturing linear trading strategies
and linear pricing, which were developed by Bernhardt and Miao (2004) and Yang and
Zhu (2020). Finally, for asset pricing implications, we consider market liquidity and price
discovery measures emphasized by OHara (2003) and Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We rst present a model of government
intervention in Section 2 and solve the model in Section 3. We then present the equilibrium
results in Section 4 and conduct numerical analysis in Section 5. Finally, we conclude in
Section 6. All proofs and gures are provided in the Appendix.
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2 A Model of Government Intervention
In this section, we develop a two-period Kyle (1985) model to analyze the impact of govern-
ment intervention on the stock market. In particular, we model government trading in the
nancial market to capture government intervention.
2.1 The Financial Market with Government Intervention
We consider an economy with two trading periods (t = 1; 2). Two assets, a risky asset and
a risk-free asset, are traded in the nancial market. The risky asset pays a liquidation value
v at the end of period 2, and v is a normally distributed random variable with mean p0 and
variance 0. The risk-free asset has an innitely elastic supply with a constant return r
(normalized to be zero) for each period.
The economy is populated by four types of traders: a risk-neutral insider (i.e., informed
trader), a representative risk-neutral competitive market maker, a large government player
(national team) and noise traders. As usual, the insider submits market orders to maximize
prots, noise traders provide randomness to hide the insiders private information, and the
market maker sets the price. The new player is the government and its behavior serves
regulation purposes.
Specically, in each period, the government submits a market order gt to minimize the
expected value of the following loss function:
p (p)
2 + cc; (1)
where p and c are two exogenous positive constants. The rst term (p)
2 captures the
governments policy motive, price stability. Formally, (p)2  (p2   p1)2, where p2 and
p1 are the equilibrium prices in the two periods. This measure of price stability is a widely
used objective function of government intervention (e.g., Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong,
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2020).5 The second component in (1), c, is the cost of intervention, which comes from the
trading loss (negative of trading revenue). Specically, we have
c = c1 + c2 with ct = (pt   v) gt for t = 1; 2; (2)
where gt is the governments order ow submitted at date t, and (pt   v) gt is its trading loss
at date t. We can show that the government makes prots in equilibrium, and so c < 0. The
specication of loss function (1) is similar in spirit to Stein (1989), Bhattacharya and Weller
(1997), Vitale (1999), Pasquariello (2017), and Pasquariello, Roush and Vega (2020).6
If p = 0, the government trades just as another insider who maximizes the expected
prot from trading. When p > 0, the government cares about its policy goal. The greater
p is, the more important is the governments policy goal (nancial stability). To economize
notations, let us dene   p=c 2 [0;1): the loss function of the government, (1), is thus
equivalent to
 (p)2 + c; (3)
where  is the relative weight placed by the government on its policy motives.
2.2 Information Structure and Pricing
Similar to Kyle (1985), the insider learns v at the beginning of the rst period and places
market orders x1 at t = 1 and x2 at t = 2, respectively. Noise traders do not receive any
5Note that in our model, (p)
2
refers to the squared distance between the traded assets equilibrium
prices p2 and p1. That is, the government only considers the price stability for one period. In fact, the
government is not always participating in the market directly. Government intervention only happens in a
turbulent market. For this reason, we only consider the case in which the government is only concerned with
the price stability for one period. Of course, we can easily extend our model to allow the government to care
about price stability for two periods. The results are not qualitatively di¤erent.
6In Pasquariello (2017) and Pasquariello, Roush and Vega (2020), there is only one trading period, and
meanwhile, the government (central bank) has a nonpublic price target pT as its private information and
seeks to minimize the squared distance between the traded assets equilibrium price and the target pT . In our
model, there are two trading periods, and the government minimizes the expected squared distance between
two equilibrium prices as its policy goals, endowed with the noisy signal about the liquidation value of the
risky asset.
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information, and their net demands in the two periods, u1 and u2, are normally distributed
with mean zero and variance 2u. The government is likely to have rst-hand knowledge of
macroeconomic fundamentals.7 Thus, we assume that the government is endowed with a
private and noisy signal about the liquidation value of the nancial asset, namely,
s = v + "; (4)
where "  N (0; 2"). Random variables v, ", u1 and u2 are mutually independent.
In (4), s is normally distributed with mean p0 and variance 0 + 
2
", and hence the
parameter 2" controls the information quality of the signal. A large 
2
" corresponds with
less accurate information about v. In particular, we can allow 2" to take values of 0, which
corresponds to the case in which s perfectly reveals v. Moreover, when 2" goes to 1, s
reveals nothing about v. The government places market orders g1 with information fsg at
the beginning of period 1 and g2 with information fs; p1g at the beginning of period 2.
The market maker determines the prices p1 and p2 at which she trades the quantity
necessary to clear the market. The market maker observes the aggregated order ows yt =
xt+ut+ gt for t 2 f1; 2g. The weak-form-e¢ciency pricing rule of the market maker implies
that the market maker sets the price equal to the posterior expectation of v given public
information as follows:
p1 = E (vjy1) and p2 = E (vjy1; y2) : (5)
3 Solving the Model
Given the model described in the previous section, we search for a perfect Bayesian equilib-
rium, in which the insider and the government choose their trading strategies to optimize
their objectives. The market makers strategy is pinned down by (5). An equilibrium is
7In fact, many investors in Chinas stock market rely on macroeconomic information, which is normally
a sector for investment banks. Thus, when government trades directly, its trading may reveal some macro-
economic information.
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formally dened as follows:
Denition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the two-period trading game is a collection
of functions





E [(v   p2) x2jv; p1] ;
x1 2 argmax
fx1g
E [(v   p1) x1 + (v   p2) x2jv] ;
g2 2 arg minfg2g
E

 (p2   p1)2 + (p2   v) g2js; p1

;
g1 2 arg minfg1g
E

 (p2   p1)2 + (p1   v) g1 + (p2   v) g2js

2. Market e¢ciency: p1 and p2 are determined according to equation (5).
Given the model structure, we are interested in a linear equilibrium in which the trading
strategies and the pricing functions are all linear. Formally, a linear equilibrium is dened
as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which there exist six constants
(1; 2; 1; 2; 1; 2) 2 R6;
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such that
x1 = 1 (v   p0) ; (6)
x2 = 2 [v   E (vjy1)] ; (7)
g1 = 1 (s  p0) ; (8)
g2 = 2 [s  E (sjy1)] ; (9)
p1 = p0 + 1y1; with y1 = x1 + g1 + u1; (10)
p2 = p1 + 2y2; with y2 = x2 + g2 + u2: (11)
Equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) indicate that the insider and the government trade based
on their information, respectively. The linear forms are motivated by Bernhardt and Miao
(2004) and Yang and Zhu (2020), who specify that the trading strategy of an informed agent
is a linear function of each piece of private information. The pricing equations (10) and (11)
state that the price in each period is equal to the expected value of v before trading, adjusted
by the information carried by the arriving aggregated order ows. Since our model includes
two periods, we derive the linear equilibrium of the model backwards.
3.1 The Insiders Problems
The insider trades in both periods, and so we solve his problems by backward induction.
Let t = (v   pt) xt denote the insiders prot that is directly attributable to his period-t
trade, t 2 f1; 2g. In period 2, the insider has information fv; p1g and chooses x2 to maximize
E (2jv; p1). Using equations (9) and (11), we can compute
E [(v   p2) x2jv; p1] = fv   p1   2x2   22E [s  E (sjy1) jv; y1]gx2:
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E [s  E (sjy1) jv; y1] =
1
22













The expression for the conditional expectation in equation (12), E [s  E (sjy1) jv; y1], shows
that the insider learns the governments noisy signal s by using his information set. The
second-order-condition (SOC) is
2 > 0: (14)




(1  221) : (15)
In period 1, the insider has information fvg and chooses x1 to maximize
E (jv) = E (1 + 2jv) = E
"
(v   p1) x1 +
(1  221)2
42
(v   p1)2 jv
#
: (16)
The last term in the bracket is obtained by inserting (12) into 2 = (v   p2) x2, which yields
E (2jv; p1) =
(1  221)2
42
(v   p1)2 : (17)


















u   21x1 (v   p0) 



















(v   p0) :



















3.2 The Governments Decisions
The governments optimization problem is also solved by backwards induction. In period 2,
the government has the information fs; p1g. Using equations (7) and (11), we can compute
E













(v   p1)2 js; y1

+ g22+










E (v   p1js; y1) = 2 [s  E (sjy1)] ;
E
 
(v   p1)2 js; y1

= E2 (v   E (vjy1) js; y1) + var (v   E (vjy1) js; y1)
















The expressions for conditional moments in (21), E
 
(v   p1)2 js; y1

, E (v   p1js; y1), show
that the government learns the private information of the insider, v, by using its information
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set fs; y1g.8 The FOC of g2 yields
g2 =




2 [s  E (sjy1)] : (23)
Combining (23) with the conjectured trading strategy (9) leads to
2 =





The SOC is 222 + 22 > 0, which holds accordingly if (14) holds.
In period 1, the government chooses g1 to minimize
E

 (p2   p1)2 + (p1   v) g1 + (p2   v) g2js

: (25)
Inserting (9) into E [(p2   v) g2jv; p1], the objective function becomes
E

 (p2   p1)2 + (p1   v) g1 +








Using (7), (9), and (11), and applying the projection theorem repeatedly, we can compute
8Equation (10) shows that the information sets fp1g and fy1g are informationally equivalent.
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3   23g1 (s  p0)








(1  41) (s  p0)E (v   p0js)  31 (1  41)E
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(v   p0)2 js

 4g1 (s  p0)  3g1 (1  41)E (v   p0js)
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21E
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+ 2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1
2




+2222 (23 + 24) + 23 (2
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2   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22)
(s  p0) :
















+ 222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1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1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+21
2




+2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2   22 + 2222

> 0: (31)
3.3 The Market Makers Decisions
In period 1, the market maker observes the aggregate order ow y1 and sets p1 = E (vjy1).
By equation (5) and the projection theorem, we can compute
1 =








Similarly, in period 2, the market maker observes fy1; y2g and sets p2 = E (vjy1; y2). By
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Following the procedure in the previous section, we characterize the perfect Bayesian equi-
librium in this section. The linear equilibrium is dened by six unknowns, which are the
solutions of six equations. In general, the model cannot be solved in closed form and so we
have to rely on numerical analysis. To examine the asset pricing implications numerically,
we focus on several variables, including expected price volatility, price discovery/e¢ciency,
the expected lifetime prots of the insider and expected lifetime costs of the government,
and the correlation coe¢cients between the trading positions of the insider, the government
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and the market maker, respectively. The equilibrium variables are formally characterized by
the following proposition.
Proposition 1 A linear pure strategy equilibrium is dened by six unknowns 1; 2; 1; 2; 1;
and 2, which are characterized by six equations (15), (19), (24), (28), (32), and (33),
together with three SOCs ((14), (20), and (31)). In equilibrium, the expected price
volatility is

















































The price discovery/e¢ciency variables are













2 = var (vjy1; y2) = E (v   y2)2 =








The expected lifetime prots of the insider and expected lifetime costs of the government
are, respectively,
E () = (1  11   11) 10+




































The correlation coe¢cients between the trading positions of the insider and the govern-
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ment are








corr (x2; g2) =
22 (
2





















The correlation coe¢cients between the trading positions of the government and those
of the market maker are
corr (g1; y1) =
110 + 
2
1 (0 + 
2
")q











corr (g2; y2) =
22 (
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Proof The proof is in Appendix A. 
For the purpose of comparison, we consider two degenerate economies: the economy with
2" = 0 and the economy with 
2
" = +1 (i.e., the standard Kyle setting). The rst economy
corresponds to the case in which the government has perfect information about the future
liquidation value of the risky asset (i.e., s = v). In this case, the government and the insider
have the same information and the equation system (composed of (15), (19), (24), (28), (32),
and (33)) can be further simplied as a polynomial of a single variable 2. In the second
economy, the government has no information and does not participate in the market. Thus,
the model is essentially the standard two-period Kyle model. We summarize the results of
the two special cases in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2, respectively.
Corollary 1 If 2" = 0, the government has perfect information about the liquidation value
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of the risky asset, and the equation system describing the linear pure strategy equi-




















2 + a12 + a0 = 0; (34)
where
a10 = 2304
26 + 25634; a9 = 16128
25 + 153633;
a8 = 45504
24 + 345632; a7 = 65408
23   15365 + 34563;
a6 = 49468
22   69124 + 12963; a5 = 184802  115203;
a4 = 2628
2   88322 + 2564; a3 =  3168+ 5123;
a2 =  432 + 3842; a1 = 128; a0 = 16:








































































where   2u=0. The expected price volatility is then







The measures for price discovery/e¢ciency are














The expected lifetime prots of the insider and expected lifetime costs of the government
are, respectively,




































The correlation coe¢cients between the trading positions of the insider and the govern-
ment are











The correlation coe¢cients between the trading positions of the government and the
market maker are
corr (g1; y1) =







corr (g2; y2) =




2 + (1 + 1)
2 + 
 :
Proof The proof is in Appendix B. 
As is shown in Corollary 1, when the government has perfect information about the
future liquidation value of the risky asset as the insider, the learning processes between the
insider and the government degenerate. In particular, four learning variables dened in (13),
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(22), (29), and (30) are degenerated as 1 = 2 = 1 and 3 = 4 = 1. The equation system
describing the equilibrium is greatly simplied and can be solved as a 10-th order polynomial
about 2.
Corollary 2 (Two-Period Kyle Model) If 2" = +1, the government has no information
about the fundamentals and does not trade in the nancial market. The general model
degenerates to the standard two-period Kyle model. In this case, a subgame perfect
linear equilibrium exists in which
xt = t (v   pt 1) ; t 2 f1; 2g ; (35)































2k (2k   1)










E (p2   p1)2 =
k
4k   10; (40)
1 = E (v   p1)2 =
2k
4k   10;2 = E (v   p2)
2 =
k




















and two associated SOCs are 1 > 0, 2 > 0.
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Corollary 2 shows that when 2" = +1, the general model becomes a two-period Kyle
(1985) benchmark that can be solved explicitly (see Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001).
9The proof of Corollary 2 can be found in Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001). In addition, since there
is no government in the standard Kyle model, the correlation coe¢cients (corr (xi; gi), corr (yi; gi)) are all
zero.
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All results are intuitive: the trading intensities (1, 2) increase in the amount of noisy
trading per unit of private information (dened as   2u=0); the market liquidity (1=1,
1=2) increases in the amount of noisy trading per unit of private information; the expected
lifetime prot of the insider, E (), increases both in the amount of noisy trading (2u) and in
the amount of private information (0); and as equation (41) shows, the equilibrium prices
reveal information gradually.
Note that, as shown in equation (40), the expected squared price change, E (p2   p1)2,
increases in the amount of private information, 0, and does not depend on noisy trading,
2u. Thus, in the Kyle-type models, price instability is driven by the speculative trading
of the insider with private information and does not relate to noisy trading. De Long,
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) and Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020) show
that stock market turbulence originates from noisy trading, and Brunnermeier, Sockin and
Xiong (2020) also consider government intervention to reduce price volatility. Our paper
complements theirs by providing an alternative origin of stock market turbulence.
5 Numerical Results
There are four exogenous variables in the model: the variance of the liquidation value of
the risky asset, 0, the variance of the noisy trading in each period, 
2
u, the variance of the
information noise of the government, 2", and the policy weight of the government, . For
analytical convenience, we make several specications about parameters. First, we dene
  2u=0 as the amount of noisy trading per unit of private information and change its
values continuously in [0; 1]. Second, we choose three possible values for 2" : f0; 2; 10g. When
2" = 0, the government has perfect information about the liquidation value of the risky asset.
When 2" = 2, the governments information quality is relatively high, and when 
2
" = 10,
the governments information quality is low. Third, we choose three possible values for  :
f0; 1; 3g. When  = 0, the government is another insider. When  = 1, the government
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places equal weight on its policy goal and prot maximization. When  = 3, the government
cares more about the policy goals than about prot maximization.
5.1 The Insiders Behavior
Figure 1 describes the insiders trading intensities in two periods and his expected lifetime
prots. For any given values of 2" and , the trading intensities of the insider in two periods,
(1; 2), increase in the amount of noisy trading per unit of private information. Since the
insider is maximizing his prots, the larger trading intensities are associated with greater
expected lifetime prots. Hence, the expected lifetime prots also increase in noisy trading
per unit of private information, .
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
We want to highlight two messages. First, as a very striking result, the insider may trade
against his signal in period 1 (i.e., 1 < 0). This will happen when the government has
perfect information and cares a lot about its policy goal (i.e., 2" = 0 and  = 3). In this
case, seeing strong information, the insider will sell (as opposed to buy) in period 1 and
buy in large quantities in period 2, i.e., 1 is negative and 2 is positive and large. This
is because  in the presence of a very informed government player who cares about price
stability  the insider wants to hide his information in period 1 and then trades aggressively
in period 2 to exploit his uncovered information and maximize prots.
Second, we can compare our results to the standard Kyle model to highlight the impli-
cations of government intervention. When the governments information is imperfect but its
quality is relatively high (i.e., 2" = 2), compared to the standard Kyle model, the insider
trades less aggressively (lower 1) in period 1 but more aggressively (higher 2) in period 2
for any given values of 2" and .
10 Intuitively, when the governments information quality
is relatively high, the insider tries to conceal his information by trading less aggressively in
10Note that if the government has perfect information (2
"
= 0) and cares only about prots ( = 0), the
insiders trading intensities in two periods are less than that in the standard Kyle model.
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period 1. In period 2, however, the insider exploits all of his information advantage and
trades more aggressively than he would in the standard Kyle model. Moreover, the trading
intensity of the insider in period 1 decreases in the policy weight of the government, , and
the trading intensity in period 2 increases in  for any given values of 2" and . As shown
by the third column of Figure 1, when the governments information quality increases, it is
more di¢cult for the insider to earn prots.
If the governments information quality is very low (i.e., 2" = 10), the willingness of the
insider to conceal his information is very weak, and in both periods, he trades similar to a
standard Kyle insider. Due to the low information quality, the government trades similar to
a noise trader and provides more liquidity for the insider.11 Thus, in this case, the insider is
likely to earn more prots than he does in the standard Kyle model.
5.2 The Governments Behavior
Figure 2 displays the governments trading intensities in two periods (1; 2), as well as the
two elements in its objective function, the governments expected lifetime costs E (c) and
expected squared price change E (p2   p1)2. The rst two columns show that for any given
values of 2" and , the governments trading intensities in two periods (1; 2) increase in the
amount of noisy trading per unit of private information (). Echoing the insiders trading
behavior, a striking result here is that the governments trading patterns depend crucially on
the weight of the policy goal in its objective function. In particular, when the government
cares strongly about its policy goal (i.e.,  = 3), it will engage in reverse trading: seeing
strong information, the government buys in period 1 but sells in period 2 (i.e., 1 > 0 and
2 < 0). In combination with the result on the insiders trading, this implies that when the
government has very precise information and cares a lot about its policy goal (i.e., 2" = 0
and  = 3), the government and the insider are trading against each other in both periods.
11If the government makes money in this situation, the noise traders will lose more money. In this case, it
is optimal for the government to quit the nancial market.
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[Insert Figure 2 about here]
As shown in the third column of Figure 2, the government always makes money when
it trades in the nancial market. On one hand, it is intuitive to see that the governments
expected lifetime prots are lower when it places more weight on policy goals relative to prot
concerns. On the other hand, the expected lifetime prots of the government increase in its
information quality. Empirical evidence of the model prediction is shown by Huang, Miao
and Wang (2019). They estimate the value creation of the government intervention that
increases the value of the rescued non-nancial rms by RMB 206 billion after subtracting
the average purchase cost, which was approximately one percent of the Chinese GDP in
2014.12
The fourth column in Figure 2 demonstrates the resulting price stability due to gov-
ernment intervention. We observe that relative to the standard Kyle model, government
intervention e¤ectively lowers price volatility for all parameter values, which implies that
government intervention is e¤ective in enhancing price stability. Moreover, the price volatil-
ity E (p2   p1)2 increases in 2" and decreases in  with good information quality. When
information quality is low (2" = 10), the price volatility is insensitive to .
13 Thus, govern-
ment interventions price-stabilizing e¤ect on the nancial market hinges crucially on infor-
mation quality. If the governments information quality is high, the government stabilizes
the nancial market e¤ectively. If the governments information quality is low, government
intervention is not e¤ective no matter how strongly the government values nancial stabil-
ity. Finally, the intervention e¤ect is less e¤ective when noisy trading is prevalent, since
price volatility increases with noisy trading. This result is consistent with that derived by
Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020), although through a di¤erent mechanism.
12The value estimated is for the stocks purchased by the Chinese government between the period starting
with the market crash in mid-June of 2015 and the market recovery in September.
13When 2
"
approaches innity, the equilibrium E (p2   p1)2 will converge to its value in the standard Kyle
model, 0:346, as shown in Corollary 2.
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5.3 Position Correlations
As the analysis in the previous two subsections shows, the insider and the government can
trade against each other, which is true when the government has precise information and
cares strongly about its policy goal. In this subsection, we further sharpen this result by
examining the correlations among the positions of the government, the insider, and the
market maker (or equivalently, the total order ows).
The rst two columns in Figure 3 show the correlation coe¢cients between the gov-
ernments and the insiders trading positions in the two periods. In period 1, if the gov-
ernment has perfect information (2" = 0) and cares more about policy goals ( = 3),
the insider and the government trade exactly against each other with opposite directions
(corr (x1; g1) =  1). If the government is less concerned about policy goals or has imperfect
information, it trades in the same direction as the insider (corr (x1; g1) > 0). In period 2,
if the government cares more about policy goals ( = 3), it trades in the opposite direc-
tion of the insider. If the government cares more about prots ( = 0), it trades in the
same direction as the insider. If the government places these two goals ( = 1) on an equal
footing, the trading correlation depends on the amount of noisy trading per unit of private
information (). When  is below a certain threshold, the government and the insider trade
in the opposite directions. When  is above the threshold, the government and the insider
trade in the same direction. Moreover, the value of the threshold decreases in the quality of
information held by the government.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The last two columns in Figure 3 show the correlation coe¢cients between the govern-
ments trading positions and the total order ows. In period 1, the correlation coe¢cient
between the governments trading positions and the total order ow is positive and decreases
in the quality of information known by the government. In period 2, similarly, if the govern-
ment cares more about policy goals, the correlation is negative. If the government cares more
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about prots, the correlation is positive. If the government assigns equal footing to these two
goals, there is a threshold in which the sign of the correlation can switch. Moreover, given
2", the switching points for corr (x2; g2) and corr (g2; y2) are the same, and the government,
as a large player in the nancial market, dominates the market maker (with trading volumes
 yi; i = 1; 2) to trade against the insider.
5.4 Market Liquidity and Price E¢ciency
Figure 4 examines the market-quality implications of government intervention. For market-
quality measures, we mainly focus on market liquidity and price discovery (e.g., OHara,
2003; Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012; Goldstein and Yang, 2017). Market liquidity
is measured by the inverse of Kyles lambda (1=1; 1=2), and a lower t indicates that the
period-t market is deeper and more liquid.14 Price discovery measures how much information
about the asset value v is revealed through prices. Given that price functions (10) and (11)
are linear functions of aggregate order ows (y1 and y2), price discovery is measured by
the market makers posterior variances of v in periods 1 and 2: 1 = var (vjy1), 2 =
var (vjy1; y2). A lower t implies a more informative period-t price with respect to v for
t 2 f1; 2g.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
The rst two columns of Figure 4 present the equilibriummarket liquidities in two periods.
First, as in the standard Kyle models, for any given 2" and , the market liquidity measures
in two periods (1=1; 1=2) increase in , the amount of noisy trading per unit of private
information. Second, relative to the standard Kyle model, government intervention exerts
mild e¤ects on the market liquidity in period 1 but raises the market liquidity in period 2.
If the government has no policy concerns ( = 0) and perfect information (2" = 0), the
14One important reason to care about market liquidity is that it is related to the welfare of noise traders,
who can be interpreted as investors trading for non-informational, liquidity or hedging reasons that are
decided outside the nancial markets. In general, noise traders are better o¤ in a more liquid market.
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market liquidity is slightly smaller than that of the Kyle model in period 1, which shows
that private information has a mild negative e¤ect on market liquidity. If the government
has imperfect information (2" 6= 0) and cares about price stability ( > 0), the market
liquidity is slightly larger than that of the Kyle model in period 1. In period 2, the market
liquidity is larger than that of the Kyle model and does not hinge on the policy weight of
the government. Third, if the governments information quality is very low (2" = 10), the
market liquidity measures in two periods converge to that of the Kyle model. With respect to
market liquidity, the negative e¤ect of information and the positive e¤ect of policy concerns
cancel out. This, again, suggests that the e¤ectiveness of government intervention crucially
hinges on the quality of information known by the government.
The last two columns of Figure 4 show that government intervention e¤ectively raises
price discovery in two periods. Because the government has information about fundamentals,
its informative trading improves price discovery/e¢ciency of the nancial market. Thus, in
contrast to the results in Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020), Figure 4 shows that
government intervention improves price stability and price e¢ciency simultaneously. In
Brunnermeier, Sockin and Xiong (2020), the market volatility comes from noisy trading
and the government has no private information, so government intervention to reduce price
volatility decreases information e¢ciency. However, in our model, the market volatility stems
from speculative insider trading and the government has information about the fundamentals.
For this reason, government intervention e¤ectively stabilizes the asset prices and improves
the price e¢ciency of the nancial markets.
More interestingly, price discovery increases in the policy weight of the government in
period 1 while decreases in the policy weight in period 2. Intuitively, in period 1, the insider
trades less by hedging on the larger policy weight of the government. To hedge on the
insiders reserved trading, the government trades more, which increases the total amount
of the informational trading and hence improves price discovery. In period 2, the insider
exploits the remaining information advantage and trades more aggressively to hedge on the
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larger policy weight. Since the government cares more about price stability, it has to trade
less aggressively, so price discovery decreases in period 2. Moreover, if the governments
information quality is very low (2" = 10), the price discovery measures in two periods are
very close to and sightly less than those of the standard Kyle model.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the implications of government intervention in a two period Kyle
(1985) model in which a government with private information directly trades in nancial
markets to achieve its policy goal of stabilizing the nancial market. We nd that when the
government has very precise information and cares much about price stability, it e¤ectively
trades against the informed insider in the nancial markets, and both the government and
the insider engage in reversed trading strategies, although in di¤erent directions. In terms of
market quality implications, we nd that in general, government intervention can e¤ectively
stabilize the nancial markets and improve price e¢ciency, but the e¤ectiveness crucially
depends on the governments information quality. Higher information quality leads to more
e¤ective government intervention. If the governments information quality is very low, gov-
ernment intervention becomes ine¤ective. Our analysis also makes other predictions that are
consistent with the empirical ndings. For instance, the government makes trading prots
in equilibrium; price volatility increases with the noise trading in the nancial markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. The insiders problem in period 2 is solved in the text. The objective
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We then derive the FOC and the SOC in the main text.
The governments problem in period 2 is derived in the main text. It is di¢cult to derive
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where, using the projection theorem repeatedly,
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Substituting the above expressions into (42) leads to the governments period-1 objective
function (27). We can then derive the FOC and SOC in the main text.
Combining (5) and (10) and applying the projection theorem, we have (32). Since





Using the projection theorem, we have that
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Using (5), (11), (7) and (9), we derive
cov (v; y2jy1) = E (v   E (vjy1)) (y2   E (y2jy1))
= E (v   E (vjy1)) (2 (v   E (vjy1)) + 2 (s  E (sjy1)) + u2)
= (2 + 2) var (vjy1) + 2E (v   E (vjy1)) (s  E (sjy1)) ; (49)
where
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Substituting (50) and (51) into (49) leads to
cov (v; y2jy1) =














Substituting (48) and (52) in (43) leads to (33).
By substitution and the projection theorem, we can derive the moments listed in Propo-
sition 1: namely, E (p2   p1)2, 1, 2, E () and E (c). In particular,
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where the last equality is obtained by substitution of Equations (47), (50), and (51).
By denition and (50), we have that
1  var (vjy1)















By denition and the projection theorem, we obtain













where the last equality comes from substituting Equations (48), (49), (50), and (51).
Proof of Corollary 1
Proof of Corollary 1. If 2" = 0, then the government has the same perfect information
about the liquidation value of the risky asset as the insider. The four s describing the
learning processes between the insider and the government are degenerated as: 1 = 2 = 1,
3 = 4 = 1. Setting 
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Substituting (59) into (54), (56), and (57), respectively, we obtain
1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Solving (32) for 1 + 1 and substituting (63) into it, we obtain


























Substituting (65) into (64) leads to




























Combining (66) and (67) gives us the polynomial listed in Corollary 1, (34). The ex-
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Figure 1: Insiders trading intensities, 1; 2, and expected lifetime prots, E (), for 
2
" = 0,
2, and 10, respectively. In each panel, the dotted black line represents the standard Kyle
equilibrium without the government intervention, the dotted dashed green line represents the
equilibrium with policy weight  = 0, the dashed red line represents the equilibrium with
policy weight  = 1, and the solid blue line represents the equilibrium with policy weight
 = 3.
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Figure 2: The governments trading intensities, 1, 2, the expected lifetime prots, E (c),
and the expected squared price change, E (p2   p1)2, for 2" = 0, 2, and 10, respectively.
In each panel, the dotted black line represents the standard Kyle equilibrium without the
government intervention, the dotted dashed green line represents the equilibrium with policy
weight  = 0, the dashed red line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 1, and
the solid blue line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 3.
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Figure 3: The correlation coe¢cients between the governments and the insiders trading po-
sitions in the two periods, corr (x1; g1), corr (x2; g2), and the correlation coe¢cients between
the governments trading positions and the total order ows in the two periods, corr (g1; y1),
corr (g2; y2), for 
2
" = 0, 2, and 10, respectively. In each panel, the dotted black line repre-
sents the standard Kyle equilibrium without the government intervention, the dotted dashed
green line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 0, the dashed red line represents
the equilibrium with policy weight  = 1, and the solid blue line represents the equilibrium
with policy weight  = 3.
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Figure 4: The market liquidities in two periods, 1=1, 1=2, and the price discover-
ies/e¢ciencies in two periods, 1, 2, for 
2
" = 0, 2, and 10, respectively. In each panel, the
dotted black line represents the standard Kyle equilibrium without the government inter-
vention, the dotted dashed green line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 0,
the dashed red line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 1, and the solid blue
line represents the equilibrium with policy weight  = 3.
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